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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-CLAss ACTIONS-ANTITRUST
LAW-REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT SHERMAN ACT PLAINTIFFS
ENTITLED TO CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23
Windham v. American Brands, Inc.,
539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976)
Since the amendment of Rule 23' in 1966,2 the issue of man-
ageability has emerged as the "main battleground" 3 in unwieldy
class action suits. Indeed, resolution of the manageability issue "will
often amount to a determination of whether the claim will be liti-
gated at all. ' 4 Parties seeking class action status must meet the
court-imposed burden of establishing that they have fulfilled all
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 [hereinafter referred to as Rule 23]. Rule 23 controls class action
litigation in the federal courts. The subdivisions of the Rule pertinent to this Note are set
out in the Appendix to this Note. infra.
Rule 23(a) contains four prerequisites joined by the word "and." and Rule 23(b) con-
tains three additional prerequisites connected by the word "or." Therefore. in order for a
class action to ,e maintained, it must satisfy all the requirements enumerated in Rule 23(a)
and, in addition, fall into one of the categories of Rule 23(b). Nearly all antitrust class
actions are brought under Rule 23(b)(3). See generally Annot.. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 19 (1971).
2 The original Rule 23. promulgated in 1938, distinguished three types of class actions
by the kind of right the class sought to enforce. These categories were the "true." "hybrid"
and "spurious" class actions. In "true" class actions the rights of the class were said to be
"joint": in "hybrid" class actions the rights of the class members were "several." but re-
volved around "specific property"; in "spurious" class actions the rights were also "several."
but involved a common question of law or fact and common relief. Most cases fell into the
"spurious" category. See Note. Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified. 51 VA. L. REv.
629. 630-33 (1965). In practice, this terminology "proved obscu.e and uncertain." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23. Advisory Committee's Note. 39 F.R.D. 98. 98 (1966).
An additional problem with the original rule was that the res judicata effect of a
judgment in "spurious" class actions was not binding on absentee members of the class.
Since most class actions were "spurious," Rule 23 often failed to achieve the objective of
resolving common questions in one suit. This problem has largely been remedied by Rule
23(c). which provides that a judgment in a class action, whether favorable or not. will be
binding on all class members who do not request exclusion from the class. See Appendix infra.
The present Rule 23 went into effect on July 1. 1966. Sup. Ct. Order. 383 U.S. 1031
(1966).
' PAc'rTsNG LAw INSTITtrE. CLASS AcTro. s 1975. at 47 (1975) (hereinafter cited as
CLASS AcrTo.s 1975].
4Id.
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the requirements of Rule 23.' Trial judges have been granted
broad discretion in determining whether the various provisions of
the Rule have been satisfied," and appellate courts have tradition-
ally respected this exercise of discretion.' Thus, the recent deci-
sion of the Fourth Circuit in Windham v. American Brands, Inc.."
reversing a district judge's denial of class action certification and
holding that "there is almost a rebuttable presumption" that plain-
tiffs with a "plausible claim" of a Sherman Act' violation are enti-
tied to such certification."' is a dramatic departure from prior class
action law and a significant antitrust milestone.
I
HISTORICAl. PFRSPECTIVE
A. Clawu Actions and the Supreme Court
Much of the controversy' currently surrounding the law of
class actions may be attributed to the Supreme Court's failure to
provide guidance on many of the issues that repeatedly arise under
Rule 23. The Court has intentionally avoided the most troublesome
aspects of Rule 23(b)(3),' 2 the subdivision of the rule encompassing
most large antitrust cases. Nevertheless. the Court's attitude toward
'See. e.g.. Senter v. General Motors Corp.. 532 F.2d 511. 522 (6th Cir.), tree. denird. 97
S. Ct. 182 (1976): Valentino v. Howlett. 528 F.2d 975. 978 (7th Cir. 1976): Carracter v.
Morgan. 491 F.2d 458. 459 (4th Cir. 1973): Poindexter v. Teubert. 462 F.2d 1096. 1097
(4th Cir. 1972): Amswiss Int'l Corp. v. Ileublein. Inc.. 69 F.R.D. 663. 665 (N.D. Ga. 1975):
Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co.. 56 F.R.D. 108. 113 (N.D. Ga. 1972): Philadelphia Ele. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co.. 43 F.R.D. 452. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
'Se. e.g.. King v. Kansas City S. Indus.. Inc.. 519 F.2d 20. 25 (7th Cir. 1975): Clark v.
Watchie. 513 F.2d 994. I00 (9th Cir.). fret. denied. 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Price v. Lucky
Store. Inc.. 501 F.2d 177. 1179 (9th Cir. 1974): Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen.
436 F.2d 791. 793 (10th Cir. 1970).
'See. e.g.. Clark v. Watchie. 513 F.2d 994. 1000 (9th Cir. 1975): Price v. Lucky Stores.
Inc.. 501 F.2d 1177. 1179 (9th Cir. 1974): Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City. 474
F.2d 336. 344 (10th Cir. 1973): City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp..
410 F.2d 295. 298 (2d Cir. 1969).
' 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976). petiion for rehearing en tren granted. No. 75-2315 (4th
Cir. Dec. 13. 1976).
' 15 U.S.C. §1 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
"539 F.2d at 1021.
" One observer has stated: "In the field of federal court practice and procedure there
is no subject that recently has been so frequently dissected. analyzed, critiqued, paneled
and workshopped as class actions under Federal Rule 23." Hauser. The Class Action Struggle
Continues: The Problems Eijrn Ignored. 44 A.B.A. AxTITRuT LJ. 75. 75 (1975).
t See text accompanying notes 45-48 inlra.
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class actions-which most perceive as conservative,' 3 if not antag-
onistic-is apparent from its opinions.
Snyder v. Harrist 4 was the first major class action case to reach
the Supreme Court after amended Rule 23 took effect. The issue
in Snyder was "whether separate and distinct claims presented by
and for various claimants in a class action may be added together
to provide the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy" 15 re-
quired in diversity cases. t 6 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
answered this question in the negative and ruled that claims of
different individuals can be aggregated only when there is a 'joint
or common" interest in the subject matter of the suit, and not when
the claims are "separate and distinct."' 7 He based his conclusion on
the traditional interpretation of the statutory phrase "matter in
controversy," an interpretation the amended Rule 23 "did not and
could not have changed."'" Commentators have generally re-
garded Snyder as a discouraging prognosis for class action plaintiffs
and have criticized Justice Black for reviving the confusing
categories of the original Rule 23. t 9
"See. e.g.. Matt s & Mitchell. The Trouble With Zahn: Progeny of Snyder v. Harris Further
Cripples Class Action.%. 53 NEft. L. REv. 137 (1974): Schuck & Cohen. The Consumer Class
Action: .1Aa Endangersd Speries. 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39 (197-1): Shencfield. Annual Surey of
Antitrust D'eloprm..ts-.ClasCu Actions. Mergers, and Market Definition: A Neu, Trend Toward
Neutrality. 32 WAsH. & LEE L REv. 299. 301-21 (1975): The Supreme Court. 1973 Tern. 88
HAXv. L REV. 41. 46-49 (1974). But see Benct. Fisen t,. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Supreme Court
Calls for Revamping of Class Action Strategy. 1974 W3 s. L REv. 801. 803-04.
84 394 U.S. 332 (1969). Plaintiff Mrs. Snyder. an Arizona shareholder of a Missouri
corporation, brought suit against the company's board of directors on behalf of herself and
"all others similarly situated." Mrs. Snyder sought personal damages of only $8,740. but
contended that the total value of the claims of all 4.000 shareholders amounted to
$1.200.000. The district court held that the claims could not be aggregated and dismissed
the case. 268 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Mo. 1967). The Eighth Circuit affirmed (390 F.2d 204
(8th Cir. 1968) (per curiam)). as did the Supreme Court (394 U.S. 332 (1969)).
394 U.S. at 333.
"28 U.S.C. 1 1332 (1970).
"394 U.S. at 336-37.
"Id. at 338.
"See. e.g.. The Supreme Court. 1968 Term. 83 HAnv. L. REV. 60. 202-12 (1969): 21
SYRACUSE L REV. 326 (1969); 24 U. MIAMi L REV. 173 (1969).
Justice Fortas. dissenting in Snyder. complained:
The artificial, awkward, and unworkable distinctions between "joint." 'com-
mon." and -several" claims and between "true." "hybrid." and "spurious- class ac-
tions which the amendment of Rule 23 sought to terminate is now re-established
in federal procedural law. Litigants. lawyers. and federal courts must now con-
tinue to be ensnared in their complexities in all cases where one or more of the
coplaintiffs have a claim of less than the jurisdictional amount, usually S10.000.
394 U.S. at 343.
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Zahn v. International Paper Co.,2" a class action brought under
Rule 23(b)(3), presented the Court with an opportunity to retreat
from the restrictive position taken in Snyder. In contrast to Snyder,
the named plaintiffs in Zahn satisfied the $10,000 jurisdictional
am~ount for diversity cases; it appeared unlikely, however, that each
of the other two hundred members of the class met this
requirement. 2' Extending the Snyder decision rather than mitigat-
ing its harshness, the Court ruled that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any
plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case---one
plaintiff may not ride in on another's coattails.' "22
Although the Zahn decision restricted the availability of Rule
23(b)(3) certification for suits brought under statutes specifying a
minimum amount in controversy, many commentators perceived
the decision as a further attempt by the Supreme Court to curtail
federal class actions in general.23 This obser~ation is of particular
significance to the antitrust sector, an area of federal jurisdiction
that is exempt from a minimum amount in controversy require-
ment 24 and therefore not directly affected by the Zahn decision. 25
Following closely on Zahn's heels was Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,26 also a Rule 23(b)(3) case and the Supreme Court's most
20414 U.S. 291 (1973).
21 The four named plaintiffs, owners of lakefront property on Lake CMamplain. sued
the International Paper Company. on behalf of themselves and approximately 200 simi-
larly situated landowners, for $40.00.000. Plaintiffs claimed they suffered damages as a
result of the company's pollution of the lake. Zahn v. International Paper Co.. 469 F.2d
1033. 10:14 (2d Cir. 1972).
2 414 U.S. at 301. quoting Zahn v. International Paper Co.. 469 F.2d 1033. 1035 (2d
Cir. 1972).
2' The decision was called a "crippling blow" to class actions. Mattis & Mitchell, supra
note 13. at 194. See also Shenefield.supra note 13: 11 HousTO. L REv. 754. 767-69 (1974).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or
protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.'
2" Thus, one commentator stated:
The importance of [the Zahn decision) for the antitrust student is its implica-
tions for the antitrust class action. . . . [Various provisions of Rule 23] may be
interpreted restrictively or broadly, depending upon the orientation of the court
involved. Zahn is interesting, therefore, because it demonstrates the Supreme
Court's willingness to accede to a denial of federal court access for certain kinds of
class actions. In short, the Supreme Court. as currently composed, is not willing to
adopt a rule of law simply because claims may not otherwise be adjudicated....
Thus. the major significance of the decision lies in what it reflects of the Court's
intention to maintain a tighter check on the reach of Rule 23.
Shenefield, supra note 13. at 306 (footnotes omitted).
26 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (popularly known as Eisen IV). For previous case history see
note 31 infra.
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impo, tant decision to date in the class action field. 27 The decision
in Eisen capped an extraordinary string of litigatio stretching back
to 1966, when plaintiff Morton Eisen filed suit in the Southern
District of New York on behalf of himself and all other odd-lot28
traders on the New York Stock Exchange. He alleged that two
brokerage firms controlling ninety-nine percent of the Exchange's
odd-lot business had conspired to monopolize odd-lot trading and
to charge excessive fees in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.29 The district court had proposed a scheme of notice
to class members by publication, even though two million of the
estimated six million class members could be identified by name
and address .3 " The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the
seventh reported opinion in the case,3' specifically rejected this
" Shortly after Zahn. the Supreme Court also decided American Pipe & Consir. Co. v.
Utah. 414 U.S. 538 (1974). an antitrust class action. American Pipe was a technical decision
involving the statute of limitations provisions in Clayton Act §§ 4B and 5(b). 15 U.S.C.
§ 15h (1970) & § 16(b) (Supp. V 1975). The Court held that institution of a class action suit
tolled the statute of limitations for purported class members who made timely motions to
intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 after the district court denied class
action certification. 414 U.S. at 560-61. Justice Blackmun. concurring, stated that the deci-
sion "must not be regarded as encouragement to lawyers ... to frame their pleadings as a
class action, intentionally, to attract and save members of the purported class who have
slept on their rights." Id. at 561.
', "Odd lots" are units of stock consisting of less th.,n 100 shares. Normal trading
units, called "round lots." are multiples of 100 shares. Eis 'n v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 391
F.2d 555. 559 (2d Cir. 1968).
:' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. V 1975).
3" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 52 F.R.D. 253. 265-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
=' Four district court and three circuit court opinions preceded the Supicme Court's
adjudication of the controversy. The following is a brief chronological history of what
transpired in the lower courts:
(1) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (class action aspect of
suit dismissed).
(2) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). cert. denied. 386 U.S.
1035 (1967) (popularly known as Eisen 1) (district court's decision appealable).
(3) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (popularly known as
Eisen il) (reversed district court dismissal of case as class action).
(4) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (further hearings
necessary to decide notice and manageability issues).
(5) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (plan for fluid recov-
ery announced, scheme for notice by publication approved, preliminary hearing on
merits ordered to determine who should bear costs of notice).
(6) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiff class "more
than likely" to prevail on its claim. 90% of notice costs assigned to defendants).
(7) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (popularly known as
Eisen 111) (class action dismissed as unmanageable. notice by publication scheme
rejected. burden of notice costs on defendants rejected, fluid recovery concept re-
jected).
The history of the Eisen case is well documented in Benett. supra note 13. See also Note.
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proposal. 32 The Second Circuit also ruled that the district judge
had no authority to conduct a preliminary hearing on the merits in
order to determine who should bear the burden of notice costs; 33
rather, the plaintiff must bear the entire expense.34 Finally, the
court firmly rejected the district judge's proposal of fluid class
recovery35 and ruled that the class action was unmanageable under
Rule 23(b)(3)(D).36
Managing the Large Class Arion: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 87 HARv. L. REv. 426. 428-33
(1973).
12 Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin. 479 F.2d 1005. 1015 (2d Cir. 1973).
3 1d. at 1015-16.
3'Id. at 1015.
3
sId. at 1018: "We hold the "fluid recovery' concept and practice to be illegal, inadmis-
sible as a solution of the manageability problems of class actions and wholly improper."
The concept of fluid recovery has most often been advanced where the identity of the
injured class members cannot be ascertained, or where the class is "so large and the aver-
age individual claim so small that the total cost of di tribution would exceed the aggregate
amount recovered for each person.- CLAss Acrto.s 1975, supra note 3. at 57. The theory
behind such recovery is that defendants should not be permitted to retain profits accumu-
lated through illegal means. A damage fund is established in an amount equal to the gross
damages suffered by the entire class:
Shares of the damage fund are then distributed to those class members who can
prove valid claims; the remainder is made available to the class at large in some
manner calculated to benefit the injured consumers and. at the very least, deprive
the wrongdoers of the fruits of their wrongdoing.
Malina. Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitnust Caves. 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 477.
477 (1972).
One of the legal arguments against fluid recovery is that some of the benefit may well
inure to persons who were not actually injured by the defendant's illegal conduct. The
Rqles Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). which authorized the Supreme Court to
promulgate federal rules of civil procedure, states that such rules "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.- Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970). permits treble damage recovery by "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... ." Thus. the
argument runs. fluid recovery illegally -enlarges" the substantive right to recover treble
damages because some members of the fluid class were never injured. See Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin. 479 F.2d 1005. 1014 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Malina. supra.
The district judge in Eisen explained that if the plaintiff could establish the defen-
dant's liability to the class, a fund could then be established equal to the amount of unclaimed
damages. The odd-lot differential (a surcharge paid by odd-lot investors) might then be
reduced "in an amount determined reasonable by the court until such time as the fund is
depleted .... In this manner, the class members, assuming they have maintained their
odd-lot activity, will reap the benefits of any recovery." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52
F.R.D. 253. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Although the court of appeals in Eisen III specifically
rejected this solution, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the issue. See notes 45-48 and
accompanying text infra. The legal status of fluid recovery is still in doubt since the Su-
preme Court vacated the entire opinion of the court of appeals, thereby nullifying its
authority. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156. 179 (1974). vacating 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the arguments concerning fluid recovery, see
Dr'elopments in the Lau--Class Actions. 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318. 1531-36 (1976).
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 479 F.2d 1005. 1016-18 (2d Cir. 1973).
1976] RECENT DEVELOPMENT 183
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit on several
important points. Justice Powell, speaking for six members of the
Court,3 7 rejected the limited notice proposal of the district court.
Strictly interpreting the language of Rule 23(c)(2), 38 the Court held
that individual notice had to be sent to each of the over two million
class members whose names and addresses could be ascertained
through reasonable effort.39 The Court maintained that the plain-
tiff had to bear the entire cost of such notice to members of his
class;40 the prohibitively high cost to the plaintiff of such notice was
irrelevant since it was an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.1
Finally, the Court stated that Rule 23 did not confer upon the
district court any authority to conduct a preliminary hearing on the
merits to decide whether the suit was maintainable as a class
action. 42 The Court then vacated the judgment of the court of
appeals and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the
class action as then defined.43
Predictably, the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen touched off
a storm of criticism. Commentators generally attacked the decision
as an "obituary" for class actions under Rule 23, or, at very least, a
severe limitation on their effectiveness.4 4 But perhaps the most
" Justice Douglas dissented in part and filed an opinion in which Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall concurred. 417 U.S. at 179.
" See Appendix infra.
1' 417 U.S. at 177.
40Id.
"Justice Powell stated that '[tihere is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice
requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs." Id. at 176.
"1d. at 177-78. The Court stated that such a hearing could result in substantial
prejudice to a defendant because it would be unaccompanied by the traditional rules of
civil trials. Id. at 178.
' The Court noted, however, that its dismissal would not prevent Eisen from continu-
ing his efforts by redefining his class under either Rule 23(c)(4) or Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 179 n.16.
4" For example. it has been observed that:
Eisen is a blow to those, particularly consumer groups, who had hoped to
develop a litigation vehicle to handle cases involving large numbers of individuals.
each of whom advances a relatively small claim.... [T]he practical effect ofEisen
is to foreclose recovery when damages are too small to warrant individual suits.
thereby eliminating perhaps the only mechanism for forcing the-corporate price-
fixer to disgorge its ill-gotten profit.
The Supreme Court, 1973 Term. supra note 13. at 48 (footnote omitted). See also Shenefield,
supra note 13, at 312; [1974] A.NTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 665. at AA-l. There
were some. however, who took heart in the Eisen decision. One commentator expressed the
view that
[u]nderlying all the questions addressed by the Supreme Court in Eisen is its tacit
assumption that class actions are a proper and important legal vehicle for social
change.... The Court's declaration that decisions on class actions are appealable
lr_ 'ts -- ,W-..
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significant aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen-as far
as ensuing class action law was concerned-was not its enunciation
of strict notice guidelines for Rule 23(b)(3) actions, but its refusal to
deal with the fundamental issues of manageability and fluid
recovery. 451 The Second Circuit, stating that the question of man-
ageability was "the most important point in the case,"46 had
squarely faced these matters. It had held that fluid recovery was
illegal and that the case was therefore unmanageable as a class
action. 47 The Supreme Court, however, restricted its comments on
these issues to a single footnote:
[W]e find the notice requirements of Rule 23 to be dispositive of
petitioner's attempt to maintain the class action as presently de-
fined. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the
Court of Appeals correctly resolved the issues of manageability
and fluid-class recovery, or indeed, whether those issues were
properly before the Court of Appeals under the theory of re-
tained jurisdiction.48
Thus, while the Supreme Court in Snyder, Zahn, and Eisen has
established clear and often harsh requirements for class action
plaintiffs, its failure to provide guidance on the manageability issue
has contributed to a flurry of inconsistent decisions in the district
courts and courts of appeals. 49 Such inconsistencies are readily un-
derstandable because class action denials are based more often on
management difficulties than on any other factor."'
even before a final determination of the merits and its strong suggestions that
plaintiff Eisen go back to the district court and pursue his action under the "sub-
class section" of Rule 23 indicate the Court's general approval of class actions.
Nevertheless. because the Court's decision affirms the dismissal of Eisen's class ac-
tion. the opinion is likely to be remembered more as a setback than an advance
for the cause of class actions. The fact that most of the positive points for class
action proponents are found in dicta of the opinion adds impetus to this pessimis-
tic view.
Benett. supra note 13. at 803-04 (footnotes omitted). See also Eisen IV: Don't Bedie the
Headlines. [1974] A.-TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 679. at B-1. urging that
"plaintiff's class action attorneys should largely disregard the black headlines warning of
the demise of class actions." because Eisen's narrow holding is favorable to both plain-
tiffs and defendants.
"' These issues were closely intertwined: even Eisens attorney admitted that the case.
with six million persons in the class, would be unmanageable if fluid recovery were not
permitted. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. 479 F.2d 1005. 1017 (2d Cir. 1973).
4
'Ild. at 1012.
"'ld. at 1016-18.
4,417 U.S. at 172 n.10.
"Compare cases cited in note 54 infra. with cases cited in note 55 infra.
5 0Eisen IV, Class Actions One Year Later. [19751 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA)
No. 711. at B-1, B-2.
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B. Lower Court Responses to Rule 23(b)(3)
Many courts, at least by implication, have treated the issue of
manageability as a distinct requirement for granting class action
status under Rule 23.51 Actually, manageability is only one of four
nonexclusive factors that Rule 23(b)(3) specifies as pertinent to the
required findings of predominance of common questions and
superiority to other methods of adjudication. 52 Elevation of man-
ageability to a threshold requirement for class action certification is
particularly understandable within the antitrust area, where as-
tronomical damages may be awarded to a massive, and perhaps
largely unidentified, class.
Management problems in large antitrust class actions most
often arise from the need to calculate damages for individual
members of a class. A common method of minimizing the difficul-
ties encountered by such calculations has been to bifurcate the
liability and damage issues. Under this "split trial" approach, the
court first tries only the issue of liability. If it finds that the defen-
dant has violated the antitrust laws, a trial of the damage issues will
follow. If the defendant is not found liable, the court need not
become ensnarled in the damage problem at all.53
A substantial number of courts have approved this method of
handling large antitrust class actions. 54 These courts maintain that
individual questions remaining after the common questions have
been resolved do not necessarily destroy the usefulness of the class
action suit. Other courts, however, have rejected the concept of a
bifurcated trial and have denied class action certification where
51 See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1016-18 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61
F.R.D. 427, 431-33 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
5 2 See Appendix infra.
" See generally CLASS ACTIONS 1975, supra note 3, at 49-55.
5 4 See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1975] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,377
(D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N.
America Inc., [1975] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,534 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Herrmann v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 65 F.R.D. 585 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp.,
62 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 19'71); LoCicero v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D.
28 (E.D. La. 1971).
In Humble Oil the court summarized the benefits of bifurcation: "Separation of the
damages issue promises convenience, potential economy, clearer jury understanding of the
issues, less embracive closing arguments, a shorter jury charge at each stage of the trial."
52 F.R.D. at 30-31.
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individual damage questions were involved.5 5 These decisions usu-
ally have asserted that the abundance of individual damage ques-
tions either makes the case unmanageable under Rule 23(b)(3)(D)
or indicates that common questions of law or fact do not predomi-
nate.
Whether the individual issues in a given class action are so
extensive as to render the case too cumbersome for the court is a
matter that rests in the discretion of the trial judge. The cases show
few threads of consistency. It is possible, however, to isolate a
number of factors that courts consider in determining whether a
bifurcated trial can save an unwieldy class action. Among these are
the size of the class,56 the average amount of recovery expected,57
the manner in which the damages will have to be calculated,58
5 5 See, e.g., Shumate & Co. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir.
1974); Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975); In re Transit Co.
Tire Antitrust Litigation, 67 F.R.D. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Smith v. Denny's Restaurants,
Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Yanai v. Frito
Lay, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 349 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Hettinger v. Glass Specialty Co., 59 F.R.D. 286
(N.D. Ill. 1973); Abercrombie v. Lums, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1976); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56
F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"
6 See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974) (class action denied
where class might number 40,000,000); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D.
549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action dismissed where plaintiff class numbered 500,000 to
1,500,000). Class size is not a dispositive factor, however. In Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N.
America Inc., [1975] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,534 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court certified a class
of 300,000 plaintiffs and ordered a separate trial on the damage issues. By way of contrast,
in Yanai v. Frito Lay, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 349 (N.D. Ohio 1973), class action status was denied
on the ground that there were too many individual questions where 73 distributors alleged
Sherman Act violations by a manufacturer.
57See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974) (class action denied
where average claim was about $2); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action dismissed where average amount of recovery would be about
$1). The cost of notice in such cases can easily exceed the expected recovery. In re Hotel
Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d at 91.
58 Courts are more prone to grant class action status where there is a simple method of
calculating damages. For example, in Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala.
1973), the court granted class action status to a group of 20,000 plaintiffs who alleged that
the bank had charged usurious interest rates on BankAmericard accounts. In response to
the defendant's contention that the case involved too many individual damage questions,
the court stressed that the damages could be easily calculated on the basis of information
in the bank's records. Id. at 59.
Similarly, in Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America Inc., [1975] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
60,534 (E.D. Pa. 1975), where class action status was granted to 300,000 plaintiffs alleg-
ing price-fixing on repair work and replacement parts for cars, the court suggested that
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whether causation as well as amount of damage must be proved, 59
and whether some type of fluid recovery will be permitted. 60 Al-
though it is difficult to note any clear trends, certain circuits have
exhibited greater receptivity to class actions than others. 6 '
plaintiffs might be able to use "statistical computations and computer analysis to simplify
the proof of damages." Id. at 67,358.
59 Compare Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 74 (1976), with In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1975] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 60,377 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). Ungar involved a
suit against a franchisor by doughnut franchisees alleging illegal tie-in sales in violation
of the Sherman Act. The district court had granted class certification. 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.
Pa. 1975). However, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that proof of the franchisor's
general policy of persuading franchisees to accept burdensome economic ties could not
substitute for proof of individual harm by each plaintiff. 531 F.2d at 1225-26. Since in-
dividual proof was necessary, common questions did not predominate, and the class action
had to be dismissed. Id. at 1225-27. In Master Key, an antitrust suit alleging price-fixing
on building hardware, the court said:
If the plaintiffs introduce proof (or if it may be stipulated) at the liability stage
that they bought master key systems and that the defendants engaged in a perva-
sive nationwide course of action that had the effect of stabilizing prices at su-
pracompetitive levels, the jury may conclude that the defendants' conduct caused
injury to each plaintiff.
[1975] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,377 at 66,638 n.3.
10 The possibility of fluid recovery militates against dismissing an action, since the need
for computation of individual damages can be largely eliminated. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"1 The Tenth Circuit, for example, has generally looked approvingly upon class ac-
tions. See, e.g., Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975) (civil rights);
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1970) (antitrust); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (securities). But see
Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975) (Truth in Lending
Act). In Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1970), the court
said: "[W]here the question of basic liability can be established readily by common issues,
then it is apparent that the case is appropriate for class action." Id. at 796. In Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), the Tenth Circuit expressed a similarly benign at-
titude:
It cannot be denied that the resolution of the class action issue in suits of this type
places an onerous burden on the trial court. But if there is to be an error made,
let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action, for it is
always subject to modification should later developments during the course of the
trial so require.
Id. at 99.
The Seventh Circuit also seems generally sympathetic toward class actions. See, e.g.,
Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976) (civil rights); King v. Kansas City S.
Indus., Inc., 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1975) (securities) (class certification denied, but policy of
Rule 23 is to favor maintenance of class actions); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc.,
503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974) (Truth in Lending Act). In the Haynes case, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of class action certification and stated:
On balance, class actions might very well be superior to individual suits, be-
cause while the former would compel correction of disclosure errors and full col-
lection of damages, the latter would result only in correction of errors, for collec-
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Nevertheless, courts have consistently held that the burden of satis-
fying the requirements of Rule 23 falls on those seeking class ac-
tion status.62 In terms of manageability, this means that the party
seeking to bring a class action must convince the trial judge that the
case can proceed without placing undue strain on the judicial
system.
II
Windham v. American Brands, Inc.: POLICY, NOT PRECEDENT
On July 29, 1974, six South Carolina growers of flue-cured
tobacco 63 filed suit in federal district court, charging violations of
tion damages would be sharply restricted by the short statute of limitations ....
the inability of the poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improba-
bility that large numbers of class members would possess the initiative to litigate
individually.
503 F.2d at 1164-65.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has been antagonistic toward class action suits,
emphatically reversing a number of district court class certifications. Kline v. Coldwell,
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (antitrust); In
re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974) (antitrust). But see Williams v. Sinclair,
529 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2651 (1976) (securities); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) (securities). Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508
F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), involved an antitrust suit against the Los Angeles Realty Board
and 32 real estate brokers by sellers of real estate, alleging a conspiracy to fix brokerage
commissions. A concurring opinion in the court's denial of class action certification said:
I do not say that the Rule 23(b)(3) class action is always unethical and im-
properly coercive. Doubtless there are circumstances in which it is the only viable
means of obtaining relief for classes of truly and actively aggrieved plaintiffs. But
courts should not be in the business of encouraging the creation of lawsuits like
this one.
Id. at 238-39. In In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974), the court rejected
the contention of the plaintiffs' attorneys that the suit would serve to punish and deter
antitrust violations: "[T]he Congressional scheme does not contemplate that private attor-
neys are to act as prosecutors to force antitrust violators to disgorge their illegal profits in
the general interest of society at large." Id. at 92. The fact that the case would not be
litigated except as a class action which would be profitable for attorneys did not disturb the
court: "[T]hat decision of the legal marketplace may be the best reflection of a public
consciousness that the time of the lawyers and of the court should best be spent else-
where." Id., quoting Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 925 (1972).
:2 See cases cited in note 5 supra.
6' Flue-cured tobacco is grown in South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina, and Virginia. It is sold by auction at independent warehouses. At the time the
case arose, there were 36 warehouses in 11 geographic markets in South Carolina. From
two to seven warehouses conducted auctions in each market. The quality of tobacco is
affected by such variables as suitability of the soil, weather, method of picking and curing,
sand content, degree of ripeness, spoilage, and disease. The government has a system of
161 grades which it uses in connection with a price support program. In addition, each
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the Sherman Act 64 by fifteen defendant tobacco companies65 and
the Secretary of Agriculture. 66 The plaintiffs sought to maintain
the action on behalf of a class of approximately 20,000 South
Carolina tobacco producers67 who had sold flue-cured tobacco in
the state between 1970 and 1974. In the first count of their com-
plaint, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants had fixed
prices on flue-cured tobacco in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.68 The second count, alleging a violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act,69 charged that the defendants had attempted to
monopolize the warehouse auction market for flue-cured tobacco
by parallel and collusive bidding and percentage purchase
agreements.7 0 The third count alleged a conspiracy among the de-
fendants to arbitrarily restrict the amount of flue-cured tobacco
that could be sold per day or per week in auction warehouses.7 '
The class of plaintiff growers sought damages of $335,811,390.72
tobacco company has its own grading system. Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68
F.R.D. 641, 647-48, 652-53 (D.S.C. 1975), rev'd, 539 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1976).
64 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
65 In addition to American Brands, Inc., the tobacco companies named as defendants
were: R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Phillip Morris Inc., The Austin Tobacco Co., Inc., Mul-
lins Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Export Leaf Tobacco
Co., Dibrell Brothers Inc., C.W. Walters Co., Inc., Gallaher Ltd., Imperial Group Ltd., J.P.
Taylor Co., Inc., Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., Liggett & Myers, Inc., and Loew's
Theatres, Inc. (Lorillard). Brief of Company Defendants-Appellees at 66-69, Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), petition for rehearing en bane granted,
No. 75-2315 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1976).
66 Earl Butz, then Secretary of Agriculture, was named as a defendant because he had
records of the names, addresses, and sales of members of the plaintiff class and had au-
thority under The Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 511-511q (1970), to regulate to-
bacco warehouses. The plaintiffs also charged that he at least acquiesced in the illegal
conduct alleged in the complaint. [1974] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP'. (BNA) No. 676, at
A-7.
67 There were four different types of "producers" under the pertinent statutory defini-
tion: owners, landlords, tenants, and sharecroppers. 7 C.F.R. § 719.2(s) (1976).
68 68 F.R.D. at 644-45. 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 &
Supp. IV 1974)) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
The plaintiffs claimed that they should have received 100 more per pound than the
defendants had paid them during the years of alleged misconduct. 68 F.R.D. at 654.
69 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)) provides in pertinent
part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ..
70 68 F.R.D. at 644-45.
71 Id. at 645.
721d. at 659. The plaintiffs sought $166,405,695 in treble damages for each of the first
two counts and $3,000,000 in treble damages for the third count. [1974] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 676, at A-7.
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The plaintiffs moved for class action certification under Rule
23(a) and (b)(3).73 After extensive discovery on this issue, Judge
Chapman of the District of South Carolina issued an order deny-
ing the plaintiffs' motion.74 He initially found that the plaintiffs
met the four requirements of Rule 23(a).75 Turning his attention
to Rule 23(b)(3), however, he found that the plaintiffs satisfied
neither the requirement that common questions of law or fact pre-
dominate over questions affecting only individual class members,
nor the requirement that a class action be superior to other avail-
able methods of adjudication. He rested his decision largely on the
belief that the case would be "totally unmanageable" as a class
action due to the many individual questions regarding incidence
and amount of damage.7 6 In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Chapman stressed that the case involved 4 different types of farm-
ers, 36 different warehouses, 11 different geographic markets,
161 different grades of tobacco, and a myriad of separate auction
transactions which had occurred during the four-year period in
issue. Rejecting the concept of fluid recovery, 77 he noted that the
plaintiffs "offered no workable formula or method to aid in the
computation and distribution of damages, '"78 and predicted that, if
allowed to proceed as a class action, the case would "degenerate
into innumerable individual lawsuits. ' 79 Judge Chapman briefly
considered bifurcating the issues of liability and damages,"0 but
concluded that splitting the trial would cause much duplication of
evidence, "further frustrat[ing] Rule 23's objective of judicial
economy."'" Concluding that the court might well be faced with
73 See Appendix infra.
71 Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641 (D.S.C. 1975).
15Id. at 648-51. The typicality and representation requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and
(4), however, did present a debatable question for the court. This was largely because some
tobacco farmers may have benefited from the tie-bidding charged in the complaint.
Nevertheless, the court resolved the issue in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 649-51.
,1 Id. at 655.
77Id. at 657. Judge Chapman's treatment of the fluid recovery issue underscores the
need for some definitive guidance in this area. Although the Second Circuit clearly out-
lawed such recovery in Eisen III, the entire decision was vacated by the Supreme Court,
which specifically declined to decide the fluid recovery issue. See note 35 and accompany-
ing text supra. Thus, the present status of fluid recovery is unclear. Judge Chapman, how-
ever, addressing himself to cases cited by the plaintiffs as supporting fluid recovery, stated
that the concept "has been rejected by subsequent opinions, the reasoning of which this
Court adopts." 68 F.R.D. at 657. He later stated that the use of fluid recovery "would
result in an unfair trial." Id. at 658.
78 68 F.R.D. at 655. See note 58 supra.
79 68 F.R.D. at 655.
8 0 Id. at 655, 659-60.
s, Id. at 655.
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"the possibility of being required to consider or even make a find-
ing on every pile of tobacco sold in South Carolina for the four
years" 82 in issue, the judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for class
action status and certified his order for review by the Fourth
Circuit.83
2 1d. at 656. Judge Chapman estimated the potential drain on judicial resources as
follows:
Assuming that it would take an average of one hour per class member to analyze
his sales records for over four years and his possible relationship with other pro-
ducers, it would take 20,000 hours, or 10 years of judicial time, assuming that the
case was given undivided attention for 40 hours per week and 50 weeks per year.
Id. at 658 n.9.
83 Since the defendants sought prompt review of the district court's order and the
Fourth Circuit readily accepted the certification for appeal, the appealability of the class
action denial was not an issue in Windham. See Brief of Company Defendants-Appellees at
27 n.***, Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976); Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016, 1020 (4th Cir. 1976). However, considerable incon-
sistencies have developed among the circuits on this particular issue.
Appeals of orders denying class action certification are usually sought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1970), as a "final decision," or under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), as an exercise of
discretion by the district judge and the court of appeals. Such orders can also be
treated-as was done in Windham-as a "final judgment" against the absent class members
under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Generally, denials of class action
certification are not "final" and are therefore not appealable unless the denial would, in all
practicality, terminate-the action. This so-called "death knell" doctrine, under which the
denial of certification would sound the death knell for the action if not reviewed, was first
propounded by the Second Circuit in cases in which the named plaintiffs' claims were too
insignificant to make the suit worth litigating. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967). The Third and Seventh Circuits, however, have repudiated the "death knell"
doctrine. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925
(1972); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975); King v.
Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit has recently
applied the doctrine conservatively, holding that the presence of a single viable claim
makes the denial of a class action certification unappealable. Share v. Air Properties G.
Inc., 538 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),
made it clear that grants of class action certification may also be appealable as final orders
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). The holding was a narrow one, however,
as the Court ruled that the order granting class action status had to meet two require-
ments: first, that it not be "tentative, informal, or incomplete," and second, that it concern
a collateral rhatter rather than the merits of the action. This latter requirement is known as
the "collateral order" doctrine. 417 U.S. at 169-72. The Second Circuit has recently em-
ployed a three-pronged test for the appealability of class action grants. Appeal will be
allowed only when the following factors are all present: (I) the class action determination is
fundamental to the further conduct of the case; (2) review of the order is separable from
the merits of the action; and (3) the order is likely to cause irreparable harm to the defen-
dant in terms of time and money spent in defending a huge class action. In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1975); Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520
F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit has held that an order granting class
action status is not a reviewable final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
19761
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In a brief decision marked by boldness, if not strong prece-
dent, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 4 Judge Wyzanski, writing for a
two-man majority, 5 concluded that the district judge had abused
his discretion by not allowing the plaintiffs to maintain a class ac-
tion on the issue of whether the defendants had violated the Sher-
man Act. 86
Judge Wyzanski noted that the court was required to "defer to
the District Judge's exercise of discretion, unless we are convinced
that he was plainly wrong. ' 87 Mindful of this rule, he approved the
district judge's conclusion that the plaintiffs satisfied the require-
ments of Rule 23(a).88 However, the district judge's application of
Rule 23(b)(3) was improper:
[B]ecause of plaintiffs' counsel and the District Court's use of the
unnecessarily comprehensive term "liability," there was not in the
lower court a sufficiently sharp distinction drawn between issues
as to the alleged violations of the anti-trust laws, and issues as to
causation. Had this line of differentiation been emphasized, the
District Court would probably have seen the cross-light which is
beamed from Section 5 of the Clayton Act.. ..9
(1970). Hellerstein v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 531 F.2d 470 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 75
(1976). See generally CLAss ACTIONS 1975, supra note 3, at 99-103; Annot., 17 A.L.R. Fed.
933 (1973).
84 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), reversing 68 F.R.D. 641 (D.S.C. 1975).
8 5 Judge Wyzanski, Senior District Judge of the District of Massachusetts, was sitting by
designation. Judge Craven joined him in the majority (539 F.2d at 1017), and Judge Bryan
dissented (id. at 1022). Judge Wyzanski may have been selected to sit on the Windham panel
because of his familiarity with Rule 23. See, e.g., 24 F.R.D. 326 (1964) (Judge Wyzanski was
a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
Among Fourth Circuit judges Windham shows a 1-1 split of opinion. Thus the decision
should not necessarily be interpreted as an accurate indicator of Fourth Circuit sentiment,
particularly because a majority of the judges voted for a rehearing en banc. Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., No. 75-2315 (4th Cir.'Dec. 13, 1976) (petition for rehearing en
banc). Moreover, in Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., No. 75-1982 (4th Cir. Oct.
19, 1976), in which the Fourth Circuit vacated an order denying class certification, Wind-
ham was not cited. See note 113 infra.
86 539 F.2d at 1021-22.87 1d. at 1020.
88 Id.
89 1d. In criticizing the district court's failure to draw a distinction between antitrust
violations and causation, Judge Wyzanski argued that the issue of "liability" centered on
whether the defendants engaged in a conspiracy; on remand, questions of causation con-
cerning individual class members could be held to a minimum. Thus "there was no sub-
stantial evidence which indicated that the trial of such issues of alleged violation would be
noticeably prolonged even if there were 20,000 plaintiffs instead of 6." Id. at 1022. This
view is in marked contrast to the district judge's perception of the "liability" issue: "[Tihe
determination of the question of liability would involve a vast amount of evidence not
related to the class as a whole and it would require factual determinations as to literally
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The Fourth Circuit accorded particular significance to section 5 of
the Clayton Act, which makes judgment against a defendant in a
government antitrust suit prima facie evidence against that defen-
dant in a subsequent suit by another party.90 This provision, said
the court,
indicates a general policy of aiding those who are injured by
violations of the anti-trust laws in ways which show Congressional
sympathy for the usually small enterprise against the ordinarily
large malefactor. As is sometimes said, there is beyond the law of
the statute the equity of the statute .... 91
thousands of the purported class members." 68 F.R.D. at 654. This difference of opinion
exists in other case law. See note 59 supra.
90 Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. V 1975), provides in pertinent part:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-
trust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under said laws ....
The defendants were not impressed with the court's argument: "This cross light has
not heretofore illuminated the opinion of any federal judge." Defendants' Petition for Re-
hearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 8 n.*, Windham v. American Brands,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976).
91 539 F.2d at 1021. Judge Wyzanski accurately portrayed the policy considerations
underlying section 5 of the Clayton Act. Enacted in 1890 (Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), was the first federal
antitrust statute. The government subsequently brought a number of suits under the
Sherman Act, but private follow-up suits were rare, presumably due to the great expense
of such litigation. See Comment, The Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litiga-
tion: Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial, 43 U. CHI. L. RFv. 338, 341
(1976); Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage
Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541, 548-49 (1976). In an effort to remedy this sluggish trend in
private antitrust enforcement, Congress enacted § 5 of the Clayton Act in 1914. Act of Oct.
15, 1914, Pub. L. No. 212, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 731.
A debate has evolved regarding the status and utility of § 5(a) in light of developments
in the common law of collateral estoppel. The scope of collateral estoppel has traditionally
been limited by the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, which provides that a party to an
action can use a prior judgment against the other party only if both parties were bound by
the prior judgment. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). However, many courts have
now abandoned this rule. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942). "Defensive" collateral estoppel may now be used against a plaintiff by a defen-
dant who was not a party to the first action. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Also, some courts have permitted "of-
fensive" collateral estoppel-i.e,, the use of an estoppel by a plaintiff not a party to the first
action against a prior defendant who had lost in that action. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden
Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
If the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel were available to a private antitrust
plaintiff in a suit against a defendant who had lost in a prior suit by the government, the
defendant would be precluded from relitigating the issues that were earlier decided against
him. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, however, provides that the prior judgment against the
defendant is only prima facie evidence, rebuttable by the defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)
1976]
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The court stated that it did not mean to imply that all Sher-
man Act plaintiffs should be permitted to maintain a class action if
they meet the requirements of Rule 23(a): "What we do say is that
there is almost a rebuttable presumption that such a class action
should be allowed where there is a plausible claim of violation of
the Sherman Act."92
The Fourth Circuit then urged a bifurcated trial on remand, 93
the district court to first resolve the issue of whether the defen-
dants conspired in violation of the antitrust laws. Should the plain-
tiffs succeed in proving such violations, the district court could
then decide whether the causation and damage issues "shall be
disposed of by separate trials for each plaintiff, or whether there
shall be one mass trial or several trials with plaintiffs grouped in
sub-classes which meet the standards of Rule 23(b)(3)." 94 The court
noted "some support" for its holding in the case law, but conceded
that its judgment rested principally on the public policy underlying
the antitrust laws. 95
(Supp. V 1975); see note 90 supra. The intriguing question that arises, therefore, is whether
the "prima facie presumption [of Section 5(a)] preempts developments in the common law
of collateral estoppel." Note, supra at 546. If it does preempt the common law (see, e.g.,
Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972)), then a strong
argument can be made that § 5(a) "has come to be a detriment to the very parties it was
designed to benefit." Comment, supra at 340.
92 539 F.2d at 1021. For further discussion of the policy-centered analysis employed by
Judge Wyzanski, see note 105 infra.
93 Id. at 1022.
94 Id.
95 Id. Judge Wyzanski cited three cases in support of his opinion, but admitted that
none of them was "precisely apposite." Id. These cases were: West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); and Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The Pfizer case involved antitrust class actions brought by several classes of plaintiffs
alleging price-fixing in sales of antibiotics by drug companies. The decision dealt with
court approval of a compromise settlement, not with the issue of manageability. The Sec-
ond Circuit, approving a $100 million fluid recovery, pointed out that "the only practical
way that individual consumers could recover in the circumstances of this case is through
the device of class representation .... " West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Antibiotic Antitrust opinion involved motions for class action certification by seven
states that wished to be excluded from the settlement approved in Pfizer. Although finding
class action status appropriate, the court contemplated that "[diamages would be awarded
on a cass-wide basis, if and when liability was established .... " In re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court was particularly disturbed by
the thought of defendants who "may freely engage in predatory price practices to the
detriment of millions of individual consumers and then claim the freedom to keep their
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III
IMPLICATIONS OF THE Windham RULE
Observers of federal practice have called the Rule 23(b)(3)
action "the most complicated and controversial portion" of the cur-
rent Rule.96 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Windham v. American
Brands, Inc. will undoubtedly exacerbate this controversy and may
expand the ranks of those who believe that the Rule is once again
"ripe for revision. '97
A pivotal element of the decision is the Fourth Circuit's new
per se rule. The court stated that there is "almost a rebuttable
presumption" that Sherman Act plaintiffs are entitled to class ac-
tion certification as long as their claims are "plausible. '9 8 Although
the scope of such a rule is not clear, few antitrust allegations are so
preposterous as to remove them from the "plausible" category.
Even plaintiffs with only a slight chance of prevailing on the merits
will fare well under the Windham standard, for the Supreme Court
has ruled that inquiry into the merits of a case is inappropriate
when a trial judge is ruling on a motion for class action
certification. 9 Since a trial judge is not permitted to inquire into
the merits of a class action at the certification stage, he apparently
ill-gotten gains .... Id. at 282-83. The court also stressed that a Rule 23 class action was
the only means by which the plaintiffs could prosecute their claims. Id. at 289.
In the Eisen decision cited by Judge Wyzanski, the district court granted class action
certification to the plaintiff and alluded to "the strong public policy behind the antitrust
laws in general, and the fundamental role of the private, treble-damage action in enforcing
those laws in particular." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The court also stated that "It]he private class action is the only means of providing for
repayment of any alleged illegal profits." Id. This decision, however, was reversed by the
Second Circuit, which held that the case was unmanageable. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes 25-44 and accompanying text supra.
As the Windham defendants pointed out, however, these three cases all involved fluid
recovery, which considerably eases the management problems encountered in damage dis-
tribution. Defendants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 5
n.*, Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976). Furthermore,
these cases merely espouse some of the general policies behind consumer class actions;
none of them establishes an expansive new rule as did Windham.
96 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 488
(1975).97 1d. at 491.
98 539 F.2d at 1021.
'9 The Supreme Court has endorsed language from Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d
424 (5th Cir. 1971): "In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not
whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits,
but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974), quoting Miller, 452 F.2d at 427.
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must certify any class action suit that is plausibly pleaded, even
though the claim may have little factual support. It is therefore
difficult to conceive of an antitrust class action so implausible that
it would fall outside Judge Wyzanski's new rule. Moreover, by
basing certifiability partly on the apparent merit of an antitrust
claim, the Windham rule may directly conflict with the Supreme
Court's holding in Eisen that inquiry into the merits is inappro-
priate. Thus the Supreme Court's holding in Eisen makes the
"plausible claim" test easier to meet, but the test itself may be con-
trary to the Court's ruling.
The new rule also fails to indicate the type of evidence an
antitrust defendant must produce in order to successfully rebut the
presumption of certifiability. An examination of the circumstances
in the Windham case-with 36 warehouses, 11 markets, 161 grades
of tobacco, and 20,000 farmers-raises considerable doubt as to
whether any set of facts could render an antitrust class action "un-
manageable." A realistic view of the court's holding, therefore, re-
veals a rule that may substantially conform to the defendants' in-
terpretation of the decision: that "virtually automatic class action
certification of the conspiracy issue" is required in all private anti-
trust cases "solely on the basis of the allegation in the complaint
that an antitrust violation did occur."'100
Courts-including the Fourth Circuit-have traditionally
placed upon the party seeking class action status the burden of
showing full compliance with the requirements of Rule 23.101 Un-
der the rebuttable presumption rule of Windham, however, those
accused of antitrust violations have the burden of showing that
class action status should not be granted. Thus the decision clearly
represents an extraordinary boon to antitrust class action plaintiffs.
Although one can only speculate as to the Fourth Circuit's
motivation in formulating such a sweeping new rule of law, 10 2 it is
likely that the compelling policy considerations underlying class
actions played a major role. These considerations include the de-
sire to provide a forum in which small claimants can recover for
large antitrust violations, and to prevent corporate wrongdoers
from retaining profits illegally extracted from consumers. The pri-
100 Defendants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2,
Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976).
101 See cases cited in note 5 supra.
112 See note 95 and accompanying text supra.'Although no case has gone as far as
Windham's rebuttable presumption rule, a number of 4ecisions have exhibited considerable
receptivity to class actions. See note 61 supra.
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vate class action may be the only vehicle for reaching these ends.
Indeed, to dismiss such large class actions on grounds of un-
manageability may "encourage corporations to commit grand acts
of fraud instead of small ones.' 10 3 Yet the Windham decision, al-
though constituting a major breakthrough in furthering these
policies, also raises troublesome questions regarding the stated ob-
jectives of Rule 23.
The Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 23(b)(3) states that
this subdivision "encompasses those cases in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and pro-
mote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated....-104
The importance of manageability in achieving such judicial frugal-
ity is obvious. Nevertheless, there are a number of indications in
Windham that the Fourth Circuit was willing to subordinate these
considerations to its desire to reach a particular result. 0 5 For ex-
103 Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
104 FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966).
105 The Fourth Circuit's policy-oriented decision may have been based on a sophisti-
cated cost-benefit analysis. Commentators have recently recommended such an analytical
framework as a means of resolving Rule 23(b)(3) issues. See Developments in the Law-Class
Actibns, supra note 35, at 1498-1516. See generally Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975). Under this approach, courts
would confine their manageability inquiry to a determination of whether any benefits
would be conferred on class members and would assume a more positive role in reconciling
class action procedure with a given cause of action. Developments in the Law--Class Actions,
supra note 35, at 1500-01, 1503-04. With the manageability issue relegated to a minor role,
traditional manageability questions would be merged into a broader "predomination anal-
ysis" (id. at 1504-16), centering on the relationship between class action procedure, sub-
stantive law, and the policies underlying the specific cause of action. This substantive
approach is required, according to the commentators, since courts, in order to determine
whether common questions predominate, must "first determine which elements of a cause
may in fact be litigated in common and which elements will require separate showings by
each class member." Id. at 1506. Within this broader framework, courts would inquire into
the traditional manageability issue of the effects on a class action suit of questions which
can be litigated only on an individual basis. Id. at 1511. Factors that courts might consider
under a predomination inquiry would include the cost in judicial time in litigating one
lengthy and complex class action, the benefits in compensation and deterrence accruing to
society as a whole from many smaller causes of action that might be successfully litigated
but for the class action, the monetary compensation accruing to each class member if the
action were successful, the deterrent effect of the class action, and possible conflicts of
interest within the class. See Dam, supra at 48-6 1.
This approach, however, may be of limited utility. Under a predomination inquiry,
courts are forced to weigh incommensurables and can only guess at a result. Trial judges
are ill-equipped to decide whether more benefits will accrue to society as a whole from a
large class action or a series of smaller lawsuits. Such a determination is a purely prospec-
tive judgment based on an estimation of the issues that may ultimately be vindicated at
trial. This judgment may be further complicated by the fact that judges will be able to rely
only on the pleadings, which may not adequately develop all the issues that will eventually
be litigated. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
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ample, Judge Wyzanski never disputed any of the findings of fact
that led the lower court to conclude that Windham would be un-
manageable as a class action. 10 6 To the contrary, he seemed well
aware that the serious management problems contemplated by
Rule 23(b)(3)(D) could arise: "Managerial difficulties are always
present in big anti-trust cases. But the case at bar, by including a
class of 20,000, will not present unusual complexities at least so long
as only issues of violation are before the tribunal.'10 7 Moreover, Judge
*Wyzanski acknowledged the possibility that separate trials on the
damage issue might be required for each plaintiff,'0 8 and he never
challenged the lower court's estimate that such a procedure would
take ten years.109 In sum, the court never seriously argued that
the case as a whole was sufficiently manageable under Rule
23(b)(3)(D). It recognized that bifurcation of the liability and dam-
age issues would only postpone inevitable difficulties." 0 By im-
plicitly acknowledging the existence of these problems, and yet
ordering that the class be certified, the Fourth Circuit created an
antitrust exception to the requirements of Rule 23.
Windham's immediate impact will be on Fourth Circuit district
court judges, who will no longer enjoy their once unfettered discre-
tion to determine whether cases may proceed as class actions. Fact-
finding that would normally lead a district court to conclude that a
Whether Judge Wyzanski employed such an approach in Windham is unclear. If he
did: it is unfortunate that he failed to enumerate the factors which entered into his
analysis; instead, he apparently relied solely on the policies underlying § 5(a) of the
Clayton Act.
106 Judge Bryan dissented on this point, stating that "[w]ith its factual recital unques-
tioned, for me the District Judge's decision is not enfeebled by an abuse of discretion." 539
F.2d at 1022 (emphasis in original).
107 539 F.2d at 1022 (emphasis added).
"s Id-
'
09 See note 82 supra.
"10 The ordering of a bifurcated trial under such circumstances has been severely criti-
cized. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE
491-94 (1975). Professor Milton Handler, speaking of the burdens imposed on courts by
large class actions, has stated:
[S]ince the seventh amendment guarantees defendants a constitutional right to a
jury trial with respect to each damage claim asserted, at some point there will have
to be either a massive trial lasting for years or a multitude of mini-trials with a
new jury having to be empaneled in each instance unless trial by jury is waived.
True, the facts may permit the court to sever the issue of liability and thus post-
pone discovery and trial on damages; but if the case is to be litigated, this problem
will have to be faced eventually and the load the court will have to carry will not
be reduced by the delay.
Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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large class action is unmanageable will no longer be dispositive in
the antitrust field. Rather, under the new rebuttable presumption
rule, the court will have to certify the class at least for trial of the
liability issue and address the management problems later. District
judges will also be forced to be more innovative in formulating
methods of proof and distribution of damages. Although different
procedures have already been tried,"" it is questionable whether
any of them will save much time. In addition, courts within the
Fourth Circuit may take a closer look at the possibility of fluid
recovery, despite its questionable legal status. 12
It is unclear whether the decision will have any significant
impact outside the Fourth Circuit. 13 Conceivably, the case repre-
sents a first step toward a new, liberal approach to Rule 23. How-
ever, no such general trend is presently discernible." 4 Should
Windham reach the Supreme Court, affirmance appears unlikely.
The Court's prior decisions dealing with class actions reveal little
willingness to adopt an expansive new rule in this area." 5 For the
present, however, the Fourth Circuit will be a desirable haven for
class action antitrust plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Undaunted by a lack of precedent, the Fourth Circuit, in
Windham v. American Brands, Inc., has held that there is "almost a
rebuttable presumption" that plaintiffs with a "plausible claim" of a
"I Among those are the increased use of masters, the use of different juries for the
liability and damage issues, and "test cases" for liability and damages. See CLASS ACTIONS
1975, supra note 3, at 54-57.
112 See note 35 supra.
113 Even within the Fourth Circuit, Windham's impact is questionable. See Ballard v.
Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., No. 75-1982 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 1976). Decided three months
after Windham, the case was an antitrust suit brought by six West Virginia chiropractors
alleging Sherman Act violations in the sale of health insurance. The district court had
denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, but the Fourth Circuit vacated the
order, stating that the district court had failed to adequately explain its ruling. The Fourth
Circuit did not mention Windham.
114 Indeed, one observer has stated:
[A]s the years have gone by since 1966, experience with the class action device has
led to a widespread change in judicial attitudes. It is a safe generalization that the
tendency of the courts today (including the Supreme Court in Eisen) is to. take a
closer and more careful look at the issues and available facts before allowing a
case to proceed as a class action. This is particularly true in the antitrust sector
where the problems of administering a case frequently are awesome, even in a
more or less conventional single-plaintiff suit.
Hauser, supra note 11, at 76.
115 See text accompanying notes 11-50 supra.
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Sherman Act violation are entitled to class action certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. This holding, supported
by the public policy underlying the antitrust laws, is a windfall for
class action plaintiffs, who have traditionally been saddled with the
burden of showing that they have satisfied all the requirements of
the Rule. Although furthering some of the important policy con-
siderations behind class actions in general, the decision neverthe-
less loses sight of Rule 23's objective of judicial economy. In excus-
ing antitrust plaintiffs from meeting a meaningful standard of
manageability, the court has essentially created an antitrust excep-
tion to Rule 23. Although the decision will make the Fourth Circuit
an attractive forum for class action antitrust plaintiffs, its further
impact is still very much in doubt.
Andrew A. Wittenstein
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APPENDIX
The subdivisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 that are pertinent to this Note are:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judg-
ment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including indi-
vidual'notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so re-
quests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclu-
sion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
1976]
